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NEGLIGENCE-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES: FAILING
TO EXERCISE DUE CARE CAN BE CRIMINAL
JOSEPH J. LISA1
1.

INTRODUCTION

Criminal prosecutions for violations of federal environmental
law have played an important role in the history of United States
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA or the Agency) enforcement strategy. 2 According to the EPA enforcement data, the
Agency initiated 372 criminal investigations during the 2005 fiscal
year. 3 These investigations resulted in criminal charges against 320
defendants, sentences imposing 86 years of imprisonment and ap4
proximately 100 million dollars in criminal fines and restitution.
The majority of the environmental statutes the Agency administers contain criminal enforcement provisions. 5 Most of these
1. Regional Criminal Enforcement Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency Region III, and Special Assistant U.S. Attorney - U.S. Attorney's Office for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (B.A. 1989, Dickinson College; J.D. 1992 and
LL.M. (Environmental Law) 1994, George Washington University). The views expressed in this article are Mr. Lisa's and do not necessary reflect those of the U.S.
EPA or the federal government. Mr. Lisa would like to thank the following persons for their encouragement and support in the writing of this Article: Julie Lisa;
Joseph and Loretta Lisa; Martin Harrell; Bill Smith; David Lastra; and Mike Fisher.
2. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of the federal environmental
crimes program, see John F. Cooney, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws:
Part 1, 25 ENVrL. L. REP. 10459 (1995).
3. See EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance - Compliance and
Enforcement Annual Results: FY 2005 Numbers at a Glance, http://www.epa.gov/com
pliance/resources/reports/endofyear/eoy2005/2005numbers.html
(last visited
Oct. 25, 2006) (discussing number of criminal prosecutions by EPA and resulting
fines and restitution).
4. See id. (noting criminal charges resulting from investigation).
5. See, e.g., Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2000); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)-(e) (2000); Clean Air
Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (2000); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (2000); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C.
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criminal charging provisions address violations that are committed
"knowingly." Such violations result from "voluntary or intentional
conduct and not because of ignorance, mistake, accident or some
other reasons." 6 Generally, this standard for prosecution is consistent with well-established "principles of Anglo-American criminal
jurisprudence" which require proof that a defendant has acted with
a certain type of mental state (mens rea) with regard to his or her
violative conduct (actual reus).7

The Clean Water Act (CWA) 8 and Clean Air Act (CAA), 9 however, contain criminal enforcement provisions that have no mens rea
component. These statutes provide for the imposition of criminal
penalties for violations arising from negligent conduct. 10 CWA section 309(c) (1) (A) makes it a misdemeanor for a person to negligently violate specific requirements of the CWA. 11 Additionally,
CWA section 309(c) (1) (B) makes it punishable if a person "negligently introduces into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works
(POTW) a pollutant or hazardous substance which the person
§ 11045(b)(4)

(2000); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b) (2000); and Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15
U.S.C. 2615(b) (2000) (discussing EPA's criminal prosecution statistics).
6. See Lt. Col. Joseph E. Cole, EnvironmentalCriminalLiability, What Federal Officials Know (or Should Know) Can Hurt Them, 54 A.F.L. REv. 1, 17 (2004); United
States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 52 n.15 (1st Cir. 1991).
See also United States v. Bryan, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998); United States v. Ho, 311
F.3d 589, 605 and n.17 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding "knowingly" requirement).
7. See Eric A. DeGroff, The Application of Strict Criminal Liabilty to Maritime Oil
Pollution Incidents: Is There OPA for the Accidental Spiller, 50 Loy. L. REV. 827, 853
(2004) (discussing requirement of mens rea under criminal penalties).
Having taken firm root in the early English common law, the doctrine of
mens rea was transplanted to the American colonies and became a part of
the legal fabric of the criminal law in this country ....

The historic

recognition of mens rea as a requirement for criminal sanction is as widespread as it is longstanding.
Id. at 838. See also Cole, supra note 6, at 3 and n.13 (quoting United States v.
Gypsum, 438 U.S. 432, 436 (1978)).
8. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-74 (2000) (stating provisions of CWA).
9. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(a) (2000) (stating provisions of CAA).
10. See W. Page Keeton, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 31 (5th ed. 1984)
(noting that CWA and CAA impose criminal penalties merely for negligent

conduct).
It is helpful to an understanding of the negligence concept to distinguish
it from intent. In negligence, the actor does not desire to bring about the
consequences that follow, nor does he know that they are substantially
certain to occur, or believe that they will. There is merely a risk of such
consequences, sufficiently great to lead a reasonable person in his position to anticipate them, and to guard against them.
Id.
11. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1) (A) (2000) (specifying acts that cannot be negligently violated).
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knows or reasonably should have known could cause personal injury or property damage:' or which causes the POTW to violate an
effluent limitation or condition of its CWA permit. 12 Similarly,
CAA section 113 (c) (4) provides for misdemeanor penalties for persons who negligently release designated hazardous air pollutants or
extremely hazardous substances and thereby negligently place another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
13
injury.
To date, the federal government has charged defendants with
these negligence-based crimes on a relatively limited basis. A 2002
study revealed that between 1987 and 1997, less than 7% of the
prosecutions initiated by the Agency charged negligence-based offenses under the CWA. 14 Still, these legal authorities have played
an important role in the EPA's enforcement activities and have
been utilized in connection with a number of high profile cases. 15
As part of the federal prosecution that arose from the 1989 oil spill
from the M/V Exxon Valdez into Alaska's Prince William Sound,
Exxon Shipping Company, the owner of the supertanker, pled
guilty to, among other things, one count of violating CWA section
309(c) (1) (A), 16 and was sentenced, along with parent company, Exxon Corporation, to pay a total criminal fine of $125 million. 17 Additionally, in March 2005, Motiva Enterprises, LLC pled guilty to,
inter alia, a violation of CAA section 113(c) (4) for negligently releasing sulfuric acid into the air in connection with a 2001 tank
explosion at its Delaware facility. Motiva was sentenced to pay a
fine of $10 million and serve a three-year probation term.1 8
12. See id. § 1319(c)(1)(B) (discussing misdemeanor releasing of pollutants
into POTWs).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4) (2000) (stating it is misdemeanor to release
pollutants into air).
14. See Solow and Sarachan, Criminal Negligence Prosecutions under the Federal
Clean Water Act: A StatisticalAnalysis and an Evaluation of the Impact of Hanousek and
Hong 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11153 (2002) (discussing how environmental negligence
cases make up small percentage of all environmental cases).
15. See id. at 11158 (stating that CWA negligence cases include, but are not
limited to, those of extraordinary environmental harm).
16. See id. at 11158 n.29 (stating to which charges Exxon Shipping plead
guilty).

17. In re the Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1048 (D. Alaska 2002); see
also Raucher, Raisingthe Stakes for Environmental Polluters: The Exxon Valdez Criminal
Prosecution, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 147, 148 and n.ll (1992) (discussing prosecutions
that arose from oil spill).
18. See Dan Riesel and Dan Chorost, When Regulatory Universes Collide: Environmental Regulation in the Workplace, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 613, 641 (2005) (discussing
facts of case); Press Release, U.S. Dept. ofJustice (Mar. 17, 2005), available at www.
usdoj.gov/usao/de/press/2005/031 7_2005_motiva.pdf (discussing changes relating to tank explosion).
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The government's use of these negligence-based enforcement
authorities has generated criticism, primarily focused on the standard of negligence required to secure a conviction. 19 Neither the
CWA nor the CAA defines the term "negligently."20 Their respective legislative histories are generally silent concerning the meaning
of this term. Furthermore, only two federal courts have issued
opinions concerning CWA section 309(c) (1) (A), with both courts
holding that this charging provision requires evidence of ordinary
negligence, as opposed to criminal or gross negligence. 21 This ordinary negligence standard was subsequently criticized by two justices of the United States Supreme Court in a rare dissent to a
denial of certiorari. 22 Currently, there are no published federal
court decisions enunciating the applicable standard of negligence
for purposes of CWA section 309(c)(1)(B) or CAA section
113(c) (4).
The purpose of this Article is to provide an introduction to and
a survey of the negligence-based criminal charging provisions of the
CWA and CAA. More specifically, Part I of this Article provides a
brief overview of the history/background of CWA section 309 (c) (1)
and a discussion of the standard of proof required to secure a conviction under both CWA section 309(c) (1) (A) and (B). Part II provides a brief overview of the history and background of CAA section
113(c) (4). It also provides a discussion of the standard of proof
required for purposes of securing a conviction under this provision.
Finally, Part III addresses the criminal penalties that are available
under the CWA and CAA and the application of the federal Sentencing Guidelines to such negligence-based crimes.

19. See, e.g., Daniel T. Buente and Kathryn B. Thomson, The ChangingFace of
FederalEnvironmental Criminal Law: Trends and Developments - 1999-2001, 31 ENVrL.
L. REP. 11340 (2001); see also Kevin Gaynor and Benjamin S. Lippard, Environmental Enforcement Developments in 2003, 34 ENvrL. L. REP. 10073 (Jan. 2004) (discussing
standard of negligence requirement under CWA and CAA).
20. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellee at *19, United States v. Hanousek, No. 9730185, 1998 WL 34078917 (9th Cir. Jan. 8, 1998) (asserting Congress did not explicitly state negligence standard).
21. See generally United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1102 (2000) (holding that § 309(a)(1)(A) only requires ordinary
negligence); United States v. Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that
§ 309 (a)(1)(A) only requires ordinary negligence).
22. See United States v. Hanousek, 528 U.S. 1102 (2000) (criticizing use of ordinary negligence standard).
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II.
A.

CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 309(C) (1)

Statutory Language
CWA section 309(c) (1) provides that:
Any person who: (A) negligently violates section 1311,
1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, or 1345 of this
title, or any permit condition or limitation implementing
any of such sections in a permit issued under section 1342
of this title by the Administrator or by a State, or any requirement imposed in a pretreatment program approved
under section 1342(a) (3) or 1342(b) (8) of this title or in a
permit issued under section 1344 of this title by the Secretary of the Army or by a State; or (B) negligently introduces into a sewer system or into a publicly owned
treatment works any pollutant or hazardous substance
which such person knew or reasonably should have known
could cause personal injury or property damage or, other
than in compliance with all applicable Federal, State, or
local requirements or permits, which causes such treatment works to violate any effluent limitation or condition
in any permit issued to the treatment works under section
1342 of this title by the Administrator or a State; shall be
punished by a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than
$25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not
more than 1 year, or by both. If a conviction of a person is
for a violation committed after a first conviction of such
person under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a
fine of not more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by
23
imprisonment of not more than 2 years, or by both.

B.

Legislative History and Background

Congress comprehensively revised the legal framework under
which the federal government regulates water pollution 24 when it
enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, commonly referred to as the CWA. 2 5 The 1972 amendments
set forth the ambitious goal of restoring the "chemical, physical and
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1) (2000).
24. See William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United
States - State, Local and FederalEfforts, 1789-1972: Part II, 22 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 215,
260-61 (2003) (discussing federal enactment of CWA).
25. See Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376) (stating Congress's enactment of CWA).
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biological integrity of the [n]ation's waters." 26 In order to achieve
this goal, Congress provided the EPA with a number of new enforcement authorities, particularly in the area of criminal enforcement. 27

More

specifically,

the

1972

amendments

enacted

misdemeanor-level criminal penalties for "willful" or "negligent" violations of certain requirements of the CWA. 28 Congress, however,

failed to define these terms and provided little, if any, explanation
concerning the terms' meanings. 29 Coupled with the unavailability
of felony-level penalties, this lack of guidance resulted in the relatively ineffective use of the CWA's criminal enforcement provisions.
In order to address this situation, Congress substantially revised and strengthened the CWA's criminal enforcement authorities as part of the 1987 amendments to the Act by making three
major changes.3 0 First, Congress eliminated the "willful" standard
26. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000) (stating goals of 1972 Amendments).
27. See William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The CongressionalPrescriptionfor Vigorous FederalEnforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
202, 203 (1987) (discussing EPA's new enforcement authorities).
A major weakness of the prior federal program lay in the area of enforcement. Federal efforts to exact compliance with clean water objectives had
languished for years. In fact, in over twenty years of the program's existence, only one case against a polluter had been prosecuted in federal
court. Thoroughly disenchanted by this experience, Congress set out in
1972 to ensure vigorous enforcement.
Id.
28. See33 U.S.C. § 1319 (c) (1) (A) (2000) (enacting criminal penalties for certain CWA violations). The version of CWA section 309(c)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(c) (1) (A), as enacted by the 1972 Amendments, provided, in pertinent part,
that:
Any person who willfully or negligently violates section 301, 302, 306, 307
or 308 of this Act, or any permit condition or limitation implementing
any of such sections in a permit issued under section 402 of this Act by
the Administrator or by a State, shall be punished by a fine of not less
than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both.
Id.
29. See John Armstrong West, Negligent Violations of the Environmental Laws:
What Standardfor Criminal Prosecution?,20 N. Ky. L. REv. 167, 177 and n.73 (1992)
(citing 118 CONG. REC. 10,644 (1972)) (discussing Congress's failure to define
"willful" or "negligent") Rep. Harsha stated:
Mr. Chairman, I would like to call to the attention of my colleagues the
fact that in this legislation we already can charge a man for simple negligence, we can charge him with a criminal violation under this bill for
simple negligence. When a violation occurs, the Administrator or the
State or the interstate agency, whoever may be involved, can either file a
criminal charge under this law if there is negligence or if there is a willful
violation of the law.
Id.
30. See United States v. Metalite Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11507 at **9-10
(S.D. Ind. 2000) (discussing Congress's revisions to CWA's criminal enforcement
authorities).
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and in its place created two separate charging provisions: one addressing "knowing" violations (CWA section 309(c) (2)) and the
other addressing violations that result from negligence (CWA section 309(c) (1)). Second, Congress expanded the scope of the applicability of the charging provisions by increasing the number and
types of substantive requirements to which they apply. Finally, Congress increased the degree of the criminal penalties available under
the CWA by making knowing violations of the CWA's requirements
felonies subject to a maximum term of imprisonment of three
years. 3 1 Despite their efforts to increase the effectiveness of these
enforcement authorities, however, Congress again failed to define
or provide any guidance concerning the meaning of the term "negligently."3 2 Thus, Congress left it up to the federal courts to enunciate the applicable legal standard of negligence required to secure a
conviction under CWA section 309(c) (1).
C.

Standard of Proof for Conviction

In order to secure a conviction under CWA section 309(c) (1),
the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant:
1. [Q]ualifies as a "person" for purposes of the CWA;
2. who negligently;
3. violated a specific substantive requirement of the Act
(CWA section 309(c) (1) (A)); or, negligently introduced
into a sewer system or POTW a pollutant or hazardous
substance which either the person knew or reasonably
should have known could cause personal injury or property damage, OR which caused the POTW to violate an
effluent limitation or condition of its CWA permit (CWA
section 309(c) (1) (B)).

1.

33

Covered "Persons"

Generally, under the CWA, the term "person" has been interpreted broadly to include a wide range of individuals. The CWA
defines the term "person" to include "an individual, corporation,
31. See United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1283 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995) (discussing how increased penalties were considered
necessary to deter would-be polluters).
32. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellee at *19, United States v. Hanousek, No. 9730185, 1998 WL 34078917 (9th Cir. Jan. 8, 1998) (asserting Congress did not ex-

plicitly state negligence standard).
33. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2000) (listing elements to be proven for conviction).
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partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body. ' 3 4 For example,
"federal employees acting within the course and scope of their employment" can qualify as "persons" and be subject to criminal prosecution for violations of the Act's requirements. 3 5 Similarly, courts
have held that an individual can be convicted under the CWA's
criminal charging provisions for permit-related violations, irrespective of whether or not the person is legally obligated to obtain a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.
In United States v. Brittain,3 6 a public utilities director was convicted of falsifying Discharge Monitoring Reports submitted by the
utility to the EPA pursuant to an NPDES permit. Although the utility and not the defendant was the permit-holder, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the defendant qualified as a
"person" for purposes of the criminal enforcement provisions of
the CWA. 3 7 Similarly, in United States v. Cooper,3 8 the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the defendant, a sewage
hauling contractor, could be found guilty of violating the terms of
an NPDES permit even though he was not the permit-holder but
merely a contractor working for the permit-holder, the City of San
Diego. 39 As a result, it is not the status of an individual (whether he
is a permit-holder), but rather his actions that are determinative as
to whether he may be a "person" subject to criminal liability under
the CWA.
Further, the definition of the term "person" under the CWA
extends to business entities, like corporations. 40 "Corporate liability for environmental crimes is 'based upon the imputation of
agents' [or employees'] conduct to a corporation, usually through
the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior."' 41 Under
34. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (defining what qualifies as "person" under CWA).
35. See United States v. Curtis, 988 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 862 (1993) (reasoning that respondeat superior principles apply violations of Act).
36. 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991).
37. See id. at 1419 (discussing what qualifies as "person" under Act).
38. 173 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1019 (1999).
39. See id. at 1201 (noting how NPDES permit requirements can be extended).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 781
(E.D. Va. 1997), affid in part, rev'd in part, 191 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 813 (2000) (describing how under CWA § 502(5), corporation is considered "person").
41. See Oliveira, Twentieth Survey of White Collar Crime: Article: Environmental
Crimes, 42 Am. CRAM. L. REx,. 347, 354 and n.34 (2005) (discussing corporate liability with environmental crimes).
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the respondeat superior doctrine, "a corporation may be held [vicariously and] criminally liable for the actions of its employees if the
acts are done on behalf of the corporation and are within the scope
42
of the employee's authority."
The 1987 Amendments to the CWA modified the definition of
the term "person" to extend to "responsible corporate officers"
(RCO). 43 Basically, the RCO doctrine "permits the imposition of
criminal sanctions against a corporate officer for violating a public
welfare statute, regardless of his or her participation [in such violation], as long as he or she is in a position with power to prevent or
correct the violation," but failed to act accordingly. 44 In the context of environmental crimes, the federal courts have focused on
the nature of the relationship between the defendant, the corporation and the violations at issue to determine whether a corporate
officer may qualify as a RCO.
For example, in United States v. Iverson,45 the Ninth Circuit affirmed jury charges which provided that a defendant could be
found criminally liable under the CWA as a RCO if the jury concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant: (1) had
knowledge of the underlying discharge of pollutants; (2) had the
authority or capacity to prevent the discharge of pollutants; and (3)
failed to prevent the discharge. 46 More specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that:
Under the CWA, a person is a "responsible corporate officer" if the person has authority to exercise control over
the corporation's activity that is causing the discharges.
42. See Kevin A. Gaynor, CriminalEnforcement of Environmental Laws, 10 COLO.
J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'v 39, 47 and n.50 (1999) (stating respondeat superior

legal principle).
43. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (2000) (providing definition of "responsible
corporate officers").
44. See Gaynor, supra note 38, at 54-55. See also Brenda S. Hustis and John Y.
Gotanda, The Responsible Corporate Officer: DesignatedFelon or Legal Fiction, 25 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 169 (1994) (examining origin of RCO doctrine and analyzing attempts to
extend application to felony prosecutions).
45. 162 F.3d 1015, 1024 (9th Cir. 1998).
In 1987, after the Supreme Court decided Park, Congress revised and replaced the criminal provisions of the CWA ....In replacing the criminal
provisions of the CWA, Congress made no changes to its 'responsible corporate officer' provision. That being so, we can presume that Congress
intended for Park's refinement of the 'responsible corporate officer' doctrine to apply under the CWA.
Id.
46. See id. at 1022 (holding corporate officer may be criminally liable under
CWA where corporate officer had knowledge that discharged material was
pollutant).
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There is no requirement that the officer in fact exercise
such authority or that the corporation expressly vest a duty
47
in the officer to oversee the activity.
Similarly, in United States v. Hong,4 8 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit upheld the use of the RCO doctrine in connection with the prosecution of a corporate officer under the
CWA. 49 The defendant James Ming Hong was held to be a RCO
and criminally liable under CWA section 309(c) (1) (A) for negligent discharges by his company in violation of the CWA's pretreatment requirements. In classifying the defendant as a RCO, the
Court focused on his substantial control of corporate operations
and finances, and his regular presence at the corporation's facility
at the time of its illegal discharges. 50 The Fourth Circuit noted that
"[t]he pertinent question is whether the defendant bore such a relationship to the corporation that it is appropriate to hold him
criminally liable for failing to prevent the charged violations of the
CWA." 51 The fact that Hong was not formally designated a corporate officer did not preclude him from being held criminally liable
under the RCO doctrine. 52 In sum, the CWA's very encompassing
definition of the term "person" means that CWA section 309(c) (1)
is potentially applicable to a broad category of individuals and
entities.
2. Standard of "Negligence"
As previously noted, the primary challenge for prosecutors, defense counsel and members of the regulated community is that
CWA section 309(c) (1) does not specify the standard of negligence
required for purposes of securing a criminal conviction. Only two
federal courts of appeal have addressed this issue to date in written
opinions. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held that, for purposes of CWA section 309(c) (1) (A), the government is required to

47. See id. at 1025 (explaining CWA's definition of corporate officer).
48. 242 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 2001).
49. See id. at 531 (holding RCO doctrine valid in connection with prosecution
of corporate officer under CWA).
50. See id. at 532 (describing court's focus in holding defendant liable under
CWA).
51. See id. at 531 (identifying main focus of analysis).
52. See id. (citing example of instance where defendant was found criminally
liable under RCO doctrine without being designated corporate officer).
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prove a defendant has acted with ordinary negligence. 53 In other
words, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. The defendant had a duty to act in a particular manner
or to abide by a particular standard of care (duty);
2. the defendant breached that duty by failing to use such
care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would
have used in similar circumstances (breach of duty);
3. the defendant's breach was the cause-in-fact of a violation of the CWA (cause-in-fact); and
4. the defendant's breach was the proximate cause of the
54
violation of the CWA (proximate cause).
Currently, no federal court has issued a written, published
opinion concerning the applicable standard of negligence for prosecutions under CWA section 309(c) (1) (B). As discussed in more
detail below, however, a number of factors justify the use of an ordinary negligence standard for purposes of this charging provision.
a. CWA section 309(c)(1)(A)
i.

55
United States v. Hanousek

In United States v. Hanousek, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that in light of the plain language of CWA section 309(c) (1) (A) and the CWA's status as a "public welfare statute," the federal government is required only to prove that a
defendant has acted with ordinary negligence to secure a conviction. 56 The Ninth Circuit also ruled a defendant must be convicted
on the basis of his own negligent conduct, not vicariously for the
negligence of another person, and a defendant's conduct must be
both the cause-in-fact and proximate cause of the violation at
57
issue.
Defendant Edward Hanousek, Jr. was hired as a roadmaster for
a railroad line, operated by the Pacific and Arctic Railway and Navigation Company, which ran between Skagway, Alaska and
53. See U.S. v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1999); U.S. v. Ortiz, 427
F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding defendant liable for negligently violating pretreatment requirements under CWA).
54. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965) (explaining

elements of a cause of action for negligence).
55. 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999).
56. See id. at 1120 (holding that under CWA, government is required to prove
defendant acted with ordinary negligence to properly secure conviction).
57. See id. at 1123-26 (explaining court's reasoning).
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Whitehorse, Yukon Territory, Canada.5 8 His job responsibilities included supervising a project involving the blasting of rock outcroppings to reconfigure a six-mile curved section of the railroad's
track. 5 9 This area of track was bordered by the Skagway River and
an above-grade section of pipeline used to carry petroleum-based
products. 60 Although the previous roadmaster had implemented
measures to protect the pipeline from falling rock, when Hanousek
assumed operational oversight for the project, he discontinued us61
ing many of these protective measures.
On the evening of October 1, 1994, a backhoe operator struck
the pipeline while attempting to remove a number of rocks that
had fallen close to an unprotected section and were partially blocking the neighboring tracks. 62 The pipeline ruptured and released
oil, some of which reached the Skagway River and created a sheen
on its surface. 63 Hanousek, who was off-duty and at home when the
incident occurred, immediately reported to the scene and investigated the matter. 64 Finding the pumps for the pipeline had been
shut-off, Hanousek elected to delay the repair of the break in the
65
line and the clean-up of the released oil until the following day.
U.S. Coast Guard officials estimated that between 1000 and 1500
66
gallons of oil were released from the pipeline.
Hanousek was charged pursuant to CWA sections 311(b) (3)
and 309(c) (1) (A) for negligently discharging a harmful quantity of
oil into navigable waters of the United States. 6 7 As part of its charge
58. See id. at 1119 (explaining Hanousek's job title and responsibilities).
59. See id. (stating that Hanousek was responsible for every safety detail for

maintenance of tracks, structures and marine facilities).
60. See Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1119 (discussing Hanousek's six-mile project,
located on embankment above Skagway River).
61. See id. (stating that after Hanousek took over project 1000-foot worksite
was almost totally unprotected). The only area of the worksite that was protected
was the movable backhoe work platform. See id.
62. See id. (finding that pipeline ruptured from fallen rocks that were attempting to be loaded on train).
63. See id. (discussing how oil continued to discharge over many days after
rupture).
64. See Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102 (2000) (stating that Hanousek
was home and off duty at time of accident).
65. See Brief of the Petitioner-Appellee at **9-10, United States v. Hanousek,
No. 97-30185, 1998 WL 34078917 (9th Cir. Jan. 8, 1998) (discussing how no cleanup began until October 2, 1997, even though spill occurred one day prior).
66. See Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1119 (finding oil was discharged over many days
into Skagway River).
67. See id. (indicating that Hanousek was also indicted for conspiracy to provide false information to U.S. Coast Guard concerning release). In addition, Paul
Taylor, Jr., a corporate officer with Arctic & Pacific and Arctic & Pacific Pipeline,
Inc., was indicted for negligently discharging oil into the navigable waters of the
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to the jury, the district court defined the term "negligently," for
purposes of CWA section 309(c) (1) (A) as:
[T]he failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care is
that amount of care that a reasonably prudent person
would use in similar circumstances. Negligence may consist of doing something which a reasonably prudent person would not do or it may consist of failing to do
something which a reasonably prudent person would do.
A reasonably prudent person is not the exceptionally cautious or skillful individual, but a person of reasonable and
68
ordinary carefulness.
The jury convicted Hanousek of negligently violating the
CWA.69 He was fined $5000 and sentenced to six months in a half70
way house and six months of supervised release.
On appeal, Hanousek argued that the district court erred by
failing to instruct the jury that the government was required to
prove that he had acted with criminal negligence (a gross deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe
in the situation), rather than ordinary negligence. 71 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction, however, holding that the CWA's criminal enforcement provisions only require a showing of ordinary
72
negligence.
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by focusing on the plain
language of CWA section 309(c) (1) (A). 73 Whereas the CWA statute does not define "negligently," the court assumed that Congress
intended that its definition be consistent with the ordinary usage
and recognized meaning of the term ("failure to use such care as a
reasonably prudent and careful person would use under similar cirU.S. in violation of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c) (1) and 1321 (b) (3), conspiracy to provide
false information to the Coast Guard, five counts of making false statements to the
Coast Guard and state of Alaska, failure to report a discharge of oil and obstruction of justice. See id. at n.1.
68. See Brief of the United States at *13, United States v. Hanousek, No. 9730185, 1998 WL 34078917 (9th Cir. Jan. 8, 1998) (citing how district court defined

negligence).
69. See United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1120 (noting Hanousek's acquittal on charge of conspiracy). Thejury also acquitted Taylor on all charges, excepting two counts of making false statements to Coast Guard officials. See id. at 1119.
70. See id. (discussing Hanousek's sentence at district court level).
71. See id. (discussing Hanousek's arguments on appeal).
72. See id. at 1121 (finding that criminal negligence is not required for conviction under CWA).
73. See id. at 1120-21 (explaining Ninth Circuit's analysis of CWA section
309 (c) (1) (A)).
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cumstances").74 Furthermore, the court held that if Congress intended to incorporate into the CWA's criminal charging provisions
a "heightened negligence standard," it would have explicitly used
75
language to that effect as it had in other provisions of the CWA.
As an example, the court cited CWA section 311 (b) (7), which provides for increased civil penalties "in any case in which a violation
76
. . was the result of gross negligence or willful misconduct."
The
Ninth Circuit noted that, "[w]here Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section
of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts inten'77
tionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.
*

The court next rejected Hanousek's claim that an ordinary
negligence standard violated his due process rights under the U.S.
Constitution. 78 The Ninth Circuit held that the CWA qualifies as
public welfare legislation enacted to protect the public from "potentially harmful or injurious items" (e.g., water pollution). 79 The
court noted that " [i] t is well established that a public welfare statute
may subject a person to criminal liability for his or her ordinary
negligence without violating due process."8 0 One of the effects of
such legislation is to "render criminal 'a type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously threatened the community's health and
74. See Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1120 (noting that Congress had not intended to
implement heightened negligence standard). "[W]e 'start with the assumption
that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words
used.'" Id. (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983)).
75. See id. at 1121 (analyzing congressional intent).
76. See id. (noting 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (7) exemplifies section where Congress
intended increased penalties) (emphasis added).
77. See id. (citing Russello, 464 U.S. at 23) (concluding Congress acts willfully
and consciously in "inclusion or exclusion" of statutory terms).
78. See id. at 1122 (explaining why permitting criminal penalties for ordinary
negligence does not violate due process).
In light of our holding in Weitzenhoff that the criminal provisions of the
CWA constitute public welfare legislation, and the fact that a public welfare statute may impose criminal penalties for ordinary negligent conduct
without offending due process, we conclude that section 1319(c) (1) (A)
does not violate due process by permitting criminal penalties for ordinary
negligent conduct.
Id.
79. See Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1121 (discussing goals of public welfare
legislation).
80. See id. at 1121-22 (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252-53
(1922); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 n.3
(1994)) (analyzing requisite mental state for criminal convictions under public interest statutes).
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safety."' 8 1 In the context of a public welfare statute, "as long as a
defendant knows that he is dealing with a dangerous device of a
character that places him 'in reasonable relation to public danger,'
82
he should be alerted to the probability of strict regulation."
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Hanousek's claim that he had
been convicted vicariously for the negligence of the backhoe operator, noting that the district court's instructions to the jury adequately charged the jury on this matter. 83 The jury instructions
specifically provided that the jury had to find that the defendant's
negligence caused the discharge.8 4 Furthermore, the jury instructions charged that Hanousek's conduct had to have a "direct and
substantial connection" to the discharge of oil from the pipeline, in
order to satisfy the requirements of causation-in-fact and proximate
cause.

85

The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently denied Hanuosek's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 8 6 In a rare written dissent from the
denial of certiorari, however, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
O'Connor, criticized the district court's rejection of Hanousek's
due process claim. 87 First, the Justices challenged the classification
of the CWA as a public welfare statute, focusing on a split among
U.S. Courts of Appeal on this issue. 88 Furthermore, Justice Thomas
emphasized that "[a] lthough provisions of the CWA regulate certain dangerous substances, this case illustrates that the CWA also
imposes criminal liability for persons using standard equipment to
engage in a broad range of ordinary industrial and commercial ac81. See id. at 1121 (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985))
(explaining public protections CWA affords).
82. See id. at 1122 (citing United States v. Staples, 511 U.S. 600, 607 (1994))
(describing nature of regulation under CWA).
83. See id. at 1123 (holding that instructions on vicarious liability were unnecessary and did not constitute reversible error).
84. See Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1123 (noting Ninth Circuit findings for discharging defendant).
85. See id. at 1124 (explaining defendant's culpability).
86. See Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102 (2000) (denying writ of

certiorari).
87. See id. at 1102 (criticizing decision of district court).
88. See id. (citing United States v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc., 157 F.3d
432, 439 n.4 (6th Cir. 1998)) (noting challenges in Supreme Court). The Court
held that "[v]iolations of the CWA fit squarely within the public welfare offense
doctrine." See also United States v. Weitzenhoff 35 F.3d 1275, 1286 (9th Cir. 1993)
(recognizing challenges to district court decision). The court noted that "[t]he
criminal provisions of the CWA are clearly designed to protect the public at large
from the potentially dire consequences of water pollution . . . and as such fall
within the category of public welfare legislation." Compare United States v. Ahmad,
101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting argument that CWA is public welfare
legislation).
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tivities. This fact strongly militates against concluding that the public welfare doctrine applies." 89 The two Justices also indicated that
the severity of the criminal penalties potentially available under the
CWA warranted a finding that the violations were not public welfare offenses and required proof of more than ordinary
negligence. 90
ii.

United States v. Ortiz91

In United States v. Ortiz, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit utilized an analysis similar, if not identical, to that in Hanousek and held that CWA section 309(c) (1) (A) requires evidence
of ordinary negligence. 92 The court also ruled that the government
does not need to prove that a defendant knew that a discharge
would enter a covered water of the United States in order to secure
93
a conviction.
The defendant, David Ortiz, worked as the operations manager
and sole employee of Chemical Specialties, Inc.'s distillation facility
which manufactured propylene glycol, an airplane wing de-icing
fluid. 94 The distillation process also produced significant amounts
of wastewater. 9 5 Rather than obtain a permit to discharge the wastewater to a local treatment plant, Chemical Specialties, Inc. represented to city officials that it would ship the wastewater to a local
business for treatment and disposal. 96 In reality, however, Ortiz disposed of the wastewater by discharging it into a toilet at the facility
which was connected to a storm water sewer that drained into the
97
Colorado River.
Ortiz was charged with both negligently and knowingly discharging a pollutant into waters of the United States without a per89. See Hanousek, 528 U.S. at 1003 (notingJustice Thomas's analysis of liability
and public welfare doctrine).
90. See id. (explaining Justices' opinions on penalties of CWA).
91. 427 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2005).
92. See United States v. Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting analysis
and decision of court on CWA).
93. See id. at 1283 (explaining Court's holding concerning government burden of proof).
94. See id.at 1279 (describing operation of Chemical Specialties, Inc.).
95. See id. (explaining process of distilling propylene glycol).
96. See id. at 1279-80 (stating Chemical Specialties, Inc. told city officials it
would ship wastewater to nearby facility); see also Opening Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at **6-8, United States v. Ortiz, No. 04-1228, 2005 WL 2124379 (10th Cir.
Apr. 7, 2005) (stating Chemical Specialties, Inc. said "no discharge would occur
from facility").
97. See United States v. Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278, 1280-81 (detailing violation).
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mit in violation of CWA sections 309(c) (1) (A) and 309(c) (2) (A). 9 8

In its instructions to the jury, the district court defined the term
"negligence" for purposes of section 309(c) (1) (A) as:
[T]he doing of some act a reasonably prudent person
would not do, or the failure to do something a reasonably
prudent person would do, when prompted by considerations that ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. In other words, it is the failure to use ordinary care
under the circumstances in the management of one's person or property, or of agencies under one's control. 99
Although the jury convicted Ortiz, the district court granted
defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the negligence
count. 100 The court ruled that as a matter of law the government
had failed to prove the defendant knew that the discharge into the
toilet would ultimately reach a covered water of the United
States. 10 ' The Court then sentenced Ortiz to twelve months in
10 2
prison.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the district
court "misinterpreted" the requirements of the CWA and that a reasonable jury, based upon the evidence adduced at trial, could have
concluded that the defendant was guilty under CWA section
309(c) (1) (A). The Tenth Circuit utilized an analysis which mirrored that used in Hanousek. First, the court held that, although
the CWA does not define the term "negligently," the language of
the statute is unambiguous and should be interpreted based on its
ordinary meaning. 10 3 As a result, the court ruled that the CWA sec10 4
tion 309(c) (1) (A) requires proof of only ordinary negligence.
"Under the statute's plain language, an individual violates the CWA
98. See Opening Brief of Appellant at **18-19, United States v. Ortiz, No. 041228, 2005 WL 2124379 (10th Cir. Apr. 7, 2005) (noting charges against
defendant).
99. See Jury Instructions, United States v. Ortiz, D.C. No. 03-CR-113-M (D.
Colo.) (on file with author).
100. See Answer Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at *10, United States v. Ortiz,
No. 04-1228, 2005 WL 4747656 (10th Cir. June 30, 2005); see also Opening Brief of
Petitioner-Appellant at **2-3, United States v. Ortiz, No. 04-1228, 2005 WL
2124379 (10th Cir. April 7, 2005) (holding that Ortiz could not be guilty of negligence for risk of which he was unaware).
101. See Ortiz, 427 F.3d at 1281 (finding no evidence of defendant awareness).
102. See id. (assigning criminal penalty for negligent violation of CWA section
309(c) (1)(A)).
103. See id. at 1282-83 (describing ordinary usage of "negligently").
104. See id. (holding that ordinary usage standard applies to CWA section
309(c) (1)(A)).
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by failing to exercise the degree of care that someone of ordinary
prudence would have exercised in the same circumstance, and, in
so doing, discharges any pollutant into United States waters without
an NPDES permit."'1 5 Additionally, the court held that the CWA
does not require proof of knowledge by a defendant that a discharge will enter a covered water to secure a conviction under CWA
section 309(c) (1) (A). 10 6 "Negligence is conduct, and not a state of
mind. In most instances, it is caused by heedlessness or inadvertence, by which the negligent party is unaware of the results which
10 7
may follow from his act."

b.

CWA section 309(c)(1)(B)

Utilizing the legal reasoning and holdings of Hanousek and Ortiz for guidance, a reasonable argument can be made that the term
"negligently" as used in CWA section 309(c) (1) (B) should be interpreted as requiring proof of ordinary negligence. First, the clear
language of CWA section 309(c) (1) (B) makes reference only to
negligence, as opposed to a standard of gross or criminal negligence. 10 8 As previously discussed, if Congress had intended to incorporate into this provision a standard of negligence greater than
ordinary negligence, it would have used explicit language to that
effect in the statute. Second, as explained by the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits, the terms of a statute usually are interpreted in light of
their ordinary usage and recognized meaning. The commonly understood meaning of "negligently" is one of ordinary negligence.
Third, the fact that CWA section 309(c) (1) (B) is part of a public
welfare statute favors an ordinary negligence standard. This standard better effectuates the underlying purpose of the charging provision-preventing the introduction into sewers and POTWs of
pollutants or hazardous substances that may cause property damage, personal injury or actually result in the disruption of a POTW's
treatment processes. Finally, in light of the manner in which Congress drafted CWA section 309(c) (1) and how subsections (A) and
(B) are intertwined into one comprehensive charging provision, it
is a more consistent and logical interpretation to conclude that
105. See id. at 1283 (emphasizing application of ordinary negligence
standard).
106. See Ortiz, 427 F.3d at 1283 (explaining that knowledge of resulting hazard
not necessary).
107. See id. (quoting W. Page Keeton, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 31
(1984)).
108. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(B) (2006) (citing language of section

309(c) (1) (B)).
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Congress intended for a single standard of negligence to be applicable to both provisions. As a result, an ordinary negligence standard should be utilized in connection with prosecutions under
CWA section 309(c) (1) (B).
3.

Covered Violations/POTW Interference

In order to be convicted under CWA section 309(c) (1) (A), the
government must prove that a defendant negligently violated a substantive requirement of the CWA. 10 9 This charging provision is very
broad in scope and covers a significant number of substantive requirements of the CWA, the violation of which can trigger criminal
prosecution. 110 For example, in Hanousek, the defendant was convicted of negligently violating CWA section 311 (b), which prohibits
the discharge in harmful quantities of oil or a hazardous substance
into a navigable water of the United States. 1 ' In convicting the
defendant, the government proved that Hanousek's negligence resulted in a discharge of oil from a pipeline into the Skagway River
creating a sheen on its surface (i.e., a harmful quantity). 1 12 In Ortiz,
the defendant was convicted under CWA section 309(c) (1) (A) for
negligently discharging a pollutant into waters of the United States
without a NPDES permit, in violation of CWA sections 101 and
402.113

For purposes of CWA section 309(c) (1) (B), however, the analysis is more complicated. First, the government must prove that a
defendant negligently introduced a pollutant or hazardous substance
109. See id. § 1319(c) (1) (A) (providing criminal penalties). See also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3282(a) (2006) (providing five-year statute of limitations requirement).
110. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A) (2006) (providing general list of sections
covered). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (describing violation of CWA by discharging
pollutants in violation of terms of NPDES permit); 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (noting water
quality related effluent limitations); 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (providing national standards of performance); 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (providing toxic and pretreatment effluent standards); 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (providing records, reports and inspections); 33
U.S.C. § 1321(b) (3) (informing on oil and hazardous substance liability); 33
U.S.C. § 1328 (describing aquaculture); 33 U.S.C. § 1345 (describing disposal or
use of sewage sludge); 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (describing National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System); 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (3) and (b) (8) (listing pretreatment requirements); 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (providing permits for dredged or fill material).
CWA section 309 (c) (1) (B) addresses negligent introductions into a sewer system
or POTW that causes the POTW to violate effluent limitations or condition of its
NPDES permit issued under section 402. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(B).

111. See United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that evidence was sufficient to convict under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c) (1) (A)
and 1321 (b) (3)).
112. See id. at 1119 (discussing details of charge).
113. See United States v. Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting
charges against defendant).
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into a sewer system, or a publicly owned treatment works." 4 The
term "introduced" is not defined for purposes of this charging provision. It is similar to the phrase "discharge of a pollutant," however, which is used throughout the CWA and broadly defined to
mean any "addition" of a pollutant to a navigable water."1 5 As a result, the phrase "negligently introduces" should be interpreted similarly, covering a broad range of conduct that results in pollutants or
hazardous substances being added or entered into a sewer system
or POTW.
POTW is defined by the CWA and includes, inter alia, "any devices or systems used in the storage, treatment, recycling, and reclamation of municipal sewage or industrial wastes of a liquid
nature." 16 Furthermore, for purposes of the CWA, a POTW is not
limited to the actual physical plant that constitutes the treatment
works. It also includes "sewers, pipes and other conveyances" that
7
bring wastewater to a POTW. 11
With regard to the hazardous substances orpollutants that are covered by CWA section 309(c) (1) (B), a "hazardous substance" is defined by CWA section 309(c) (7) as encompassing: substances
designated for purposes of CWA section 311 (b) (2) (A); substances
designated for purposes of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) section 102;
hazardous waste identified or listed pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) section 3001; any toxic pollutant listed under CWA section 307(a); and any imminently
hazardous chemical substance or mixture addressed by the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA) section 7.118 The term "pollutant"
is similarly defined very broadly to include, among other things:
solid waste; radioactive materials; sewage; garbage; sand; rock; and
heat.

19

The second part of the analysis under CWA section
309(c) (I) (B) requires proof that either the person responsible for
the negligent introduction knew or reasonably should have known
that such a hazardous substance or pollutant could cause personal
114. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(B) (2000) (citing the language of the
statute).
115. See id. § 1362(12) (providing definitions for Water Pollution Prevention
and Control General Provisions).
116. See id. § 1292(2) (A) (specifying what is considered to be "treatment
works").
117. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 403.3(q) (2006) (explaining scope of POTW definition).
118. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (7) (2000) (defining "hazardous substance").
119. See id. § 1362(6) (providing broad definition of "pollutant").
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injury or property damage, or that the negligent introduction of a

hazardous substance or pollutant actually caused a POTW to violate
an effluent limitation or condition of its CWA permit. 120 With regard to the issue of a person's knowledge, actual harm (i.e., actual
personal injury or property damage) is not required for purposes of
a conviction. Rather, only evidence that the person either subjectively knew that these materials could cause such injury or harm or
that a reasonable person objectively would have known of such potential for harm is required. The second condition of CWA section
309(c)(1)(B), however, requires that the negligent introduction
causes an actual violation by a POTW of its operating permit. 12 1 In
light of the fact that this is a negligence-based charging provision, it
is reasonable to assume that this negligent introduction will need to
be both the cause-in-fact and proximate cause of the POTW's permit violation. One potential source of evidence concerning such a
violation may be the POTW's monthly Discharge Monitoring
Reports.
4.

Summary

CWA section 309(c) (1) (A) and (B) allow the government to
address situations in which evidence of a knowing violation is unavailable, but imposition of a criminal penalty is warranted in light
of a defendant's actions and the resulting potential harm to human
health and the environment. To date, courts have held that the
applicable standard of negligence required to secure a criminal
conviction is one of ordinary negligence. 122 These rulings have
greatly enhanced the enforcement value of these charging provisions. Additionally, these criminal enforcement provisions provide
prosecutors and defense counsel with an effective and legitimate
tool for the purposes of plea negotiations.
III.

A.

CLEAN AIR Ac-r SECTION

113(C) (4)

Statutory Language
The CAA section 113(c) (4), provides:
Any person who negligently releases into the ambient air
any hazardous air pollutant listed pursuant to section 7412

120. See id. § 1319(c)(1)(B) (citing language of statute).
121. See id. (citing language of statute).
122. See United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding defendant liable for negligently violating CWA).
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of this title or any extremely hazardous substance listed
pursuant to section 11002(a) (2) of this title that is not
listed in section 7412 of this title, and who at the time negligently places another person in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily injury shall, upon conviction, be
punished by a fine under Title 18, or by imprisonment for
not more than 1 year, or both. If a conviction of any person under this paragraph is for a violation committed after
a first conviction of such person under this paragraph, the
maximum punishment shall be doubled with respect to
1 23
both the fine and imprisonment.

B.

Legislative History and Background

In 1990, Congress dramatically changed the manner in which
hazardous air pollutants are regulated under the CAA. t 24 The 1990
Amendments to the CAA came in response to the 1984 release of
methyl isocyanate in Bhopal, India, which killed more than 2000
people, and a chemical release in Institute, West Virginia, which
caused more than one hundred people to seek medical attention.
In addition to significantly expanding the number of hazardous air
pollutants that are regulated by CAA section 112, Congress substantially revised and strengthened the CAA's criminal enforcement authorities. 125 More specifically, Congress increased the penalties
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2000).
124. For a comprehensive discussion of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, see Stephen E. Roady, Permittingand Enforcement Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVrL. L. REP. 10178 (1991) (providing comprehensive discussion of CAA Amendments of 1990); see also Arnold W. Reitze,Jr. and Randy Lowell,
Control of Hazardous Air Pollution, 28 B.C. ENVrL. Air. L. REv. 229, 247 (2001) (discussing 1990 Amendments).
125. SeeJames Miskiewicz and John S. Rudd, Civil and CriminalEnforcement of
the Clean Air Act After the 1990 Amendments, 9 PACE ENVrL. L. REv. 281, 374, n. 370
(1992) (citing National Enforcement Investigations Center, U.S. E.P.A., Summary
of Criminal Prosecutions Resulting From Environmental Investigations (May 31,
1992)).
In practice, however, the old criminal provisions were hardly enforced.
Between fiscal years 1983 and 1992, only 68 defendants were charged
with violating the Clean Air Act, as compared to 317 defendants who
faced criminal prosecution under RCRA, and 205 defendants charged
under the CWA. Those violations that could be criminally prosecuted
[under the pre-1990 CAA] carried lenient penalties when compared to
other federal environmental statutes.
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that are available under many of the CAA's criminal enforcement
126
provisions from misdemeanors to felonies.
Additionally, Congress enacted two new charging provisions to

address situations in which releases of certain air pollutants endanger the health and safety of the public. First, Congress enacted
CAA section 113(c) (5) (A), which provides felony-level sanctions for
a knowing release of certain hazardous air pollutants or extremely
hazardous substances that the person responsible for the release
knows places another person in imminent danger of death or seri-

ous bodily injury. 12 7 Congress modeled this provision on similar
enforcement authorities in the CWA and RCRA. 128 Second, Congress elected to move one step beyond the CWA and RCRA, and
enacted a precedent-setting negligent endangerment offense.
Codified at CAA section 113(c) (4), the CAA's negligent endangerment provision provides for the imposition of misdemeanor penalties for negligent releases of certain designated hazardous air
pollutants or extremely hazardous substances that, at the time of
the release, negligently place another person in imminent danger
of death or serious bodily injury.1 2 9 Consistent with past practice,
Congress failed to define the operative term of this charging provision "negligently." Additionally, no federal court to date has issued

a decision addressing the applicable standard of negligence. As explained in more detail below, however, a reasoned argument can be
made that CAA section 113(c) (4) should be interpreted as requiring evidence of ordinary negligence.
C.

Standard of Proof for Conviction

Under CAA section 113(c) (4), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant:
1. [Q]ualifies as a "person" for purposes of the CAA;
126. See id. at 374 (noting that Congress increased some penalties to felonies).
According to one commentator, one immediate improvement in the enforcement
potential of the Act is the upgrading of these violations from misdemeanors to
felonies. See id.
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(A) (2000);John Gibson, The Crime of "Knowing Endangerment" Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Is It More "Bark Than
Bite" as a Watchdog to Help Safeguard a Workplace Free From Life-Threatening Hazardous
Air Pollutant Releases?, 6 FoRDHAM ENvrL. L.J. 197, 198 n.8 (1995) (noting that
CWA Amendments incorporate crime of "knowing endangerment").
128. See Senate Committee on Public Works, 103rd Cong., 1st Session, A LEGISLATIVE HIsToRy OF THE CLEAN AIR Acr AMENDMENTS OF 1990, Serial No. 103-38,
Vol. I at 941 (1993) (noting criminal provisions of section 113(c) of CAA as similar
to those of CWA and RCRA).
129. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (4) (2000) (summarizing negligent
endangerment provision of CAA).
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2. who negligently;
3. released into the ambient air;
4. a hazardous air pollutant, as provided by CAA section
312, 42 U.S.C. § 7412, or an extremely hazardous substance, as provided by the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) section 302 (a) (2), 42
U.S.C. § 11002(a)(2); and
5. which, at the time of the release, negligently placed another person in imminent danger of death or serious bod130
ily injury.
1.

Covered "Persons"

The term "person" for purposes of the CAA is defined very
broadly to mean "an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, political subdivision of a State, and any
agency, department, or instrumentality of the United States and
any officer, agent or employee thereof." 131 As part of the 1977
Amendments, the definition of "person," for purposes of the CAA's
criminal enforcement provisions, was expanded to include
RCOs. 13 2 As previously discussed, with regard to public welfare statutes, the RCO doctrine extends criminal liability to corporate officers who, because of their position in a corporation, possess the
authority to prevent or correct violations but fail to act accordingly
with regard to such violations.
Whereas the RCO doctrine expanded the definition of "person," a provision added by the 1990 Amendments to the CAA significantly restricted the applicability of this term. More specifically,
CAA section 113(h) provides that "an employee who is carrying out
his normal activities and who is not a part of senior management
personnel or a corporate officer" does not qualify as a person for
purposes of CAA section 113(c)(4), unless the employee's actions
are both "knowing and willful."1 3 3 As a technical matter, CAA sec-

tion 113(h) does not alter the definition of the term "person," so
much as to impose on the government a scienter or mens rea re130. See id. (listing elements government must prove for conviction).
131. See id. § 7602(e) (defining "person" broadly).
132. See id. § 7413(c) (6) (defining "person" to include responsible corporate
officer for purposes of criminal penalty subsection of CAA).
133. See Miskiewicz, supra note 117 at 383-84 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7413(h)
(Supp. 11 1990)).
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quirement as a condition precedent to convicting certain types of
employees under CAA section 113(c) (4).134
On its face, CAA section 113(h) may appear relatively straightforward. 13 5 In reality, however, it presents a number of significant
challenges for both prosecutors and defense counsel. First, the
terms "employee" and "senior management personnel" are not defined. To date, one federal court has held that a supervisor may
13 6
qualify as an employee for purposes of CAA section 113(h).
Neither Congress nor the federal courts, however, have definitively
stated what level of supervisory or management authority may
render a person "part of senior management" of a company. Second, CAA section 113(h) does not define what constitutes "normal
activities" on the part of an employee. One commentator has posited the following question: "Would such activities include unlawful, but regularly ordered by-passes of statutorily mandated control
measures? Or does the phrase 'normal activities' presume only con13 7
duct which is lawful under the requirements of the Act?"'
Finally, it is unclear who bears the burden of raising and proving the applicability of CAA section 113(h). In United States v. Pearson, 138 the Ninth Circuit heard arguments in a prosecution for
violations of the CAA's National Emissions Standards for Hazardous
Air Pollutants (NESHAP) with regard to asbestos.1 39 The court
held that CAA section 113(h) is an affirmative defense and that a
defendant bears the burden of raising and proving the applicability
of the provision.140 As a matter of general criminal procedure, the
U.S. Supreme Court has held that the government normally bears
not only the burden of proving all elements of a charged offense,
but also the burden to "disprove beyond a reasonable doubt any
141
defense that [may] negate an element of the charged offense."
134. See id. at 384 (noting that CAA section 113(h) does not alter definition of
term "person" so as to impose additional requirement on government for
conviction).
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (6) (2000) (citing language of section 113(h)).
136. See United States v. Pearson, 274 F.3d 1225, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 2001) (defining "employee" as "person employed by another for salary or wages").
137. See Miskiewicz, supranote 117, at 388 (speculating what constitutes "normal activities" on part of employee).
138. 274 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2001).
139. See id. at 1228 (stating facts of case).
140. See id. at 1232 (noting defendant has burden of proving he or she was
performing usual duties or acting under direction of employer).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating
although Due Process Clause requires government to prove all elements of
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt). See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970) (requiring government to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt any defense
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One can reasonably argue that CAA section 113(h) negates an element of the negligent endangerment offense under CAA section
113(c) (4) by imposing a scienter requirement on the government
to prove that a release and endangerment resulted not from negligence, but from "knowing and willful" conduct. Under this analysis, the government would bear the burden of proving that CAA
section 113(h) does not apply to a particular defendant. Ultimately,
CAA section 113(h) significantly complicates the issue of who qualifies as a "person" for purposes of the CAA's negligent endangerment charging provisions.
One final point that must be considered when addressing the
meaning of the term "person" is that CAA section 113(c) (4) does
not require a violation of a substantive requirement of the CAA.
This is significant and has direct implications concerning the types
of individuals and organizations who may be convicted under this
charging provision. The CAA's asbestos NESHAP standards are applicable to owners and operators of demolition or renovation activities. 14 2 As a result, in a criminal prosecution under CAA section
113(c)(1) for a knowing violation of the asbestos NESHAP standards, the government must prove not only that a defendant qualifies as a "person," but also that the defendant is an "owner" or
"operator" of a renovation or demolition activity. 143 With regard to
prosecutions under CAA section 113(c)(4), however, the government does not need to prove an underlying substantive violation
and, therefore, does not need to prove that a defendant, in addition to qualifying as a "person," is also an "owner" or "operator."
2.

Standard of Negligence
a. Proposed Standard

Despite the previously noted lack of guidance by Congress and
the federal courts concerning the meaning of the term "negligently," a reasonable argument can be made that CAA section
113(c) (4) requires proof of ordinary negligence. As explained in
more detail below, such a standard is justified by, among other
things, the explicit language of the statutory section and the CAA's
status as a public welfare statute.
that negates element of charged offense); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
210-11 (1977) (finding there is no constitutional bar to defendant bearing burden
of persuasion on defenses that do not negate element of offense).
142. See 40 C.F.R. pts. 61.141, 145 (2006) (defining terms and applicability of
standards).
143. See Pearson, 274 F.3d at 1229-30 (explaining required proof of "person"
qualification).
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First, the language of CAA section 113(c)(4) can be interpreted as indicating that Congress intended an ordinary negligence
standard. As a matter of statutory interpretation, courts first look to
the plain language of the statute to determine its meaning. 14 4 The
commonly accepted meaning of the term "negligently" is one of
ordinary negligence ("failure to use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use under similar circumstances"). 145 Nothing in CAA section 113(c) (4) suggests a different
or heightened standard of negligence.
Second, in drafting CAA section 113(c)(4), Congress specifically used the term "negligently," as opposed to specifying a heightened standard (gross or criminal negligence). As the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted in Hanousek, "if Congress intended to prescribe a heightened negligence standard, it could
146
have done so explicitly" in the statute.
In fact, when Congress has wanted to incorporate a heightened
standard of negligence into the enforcement provisions of a statute,
it has explicitly provided for such a standard. For example, CWA
section 311 (b) (7) provides for increased civil penalties "in any case
in which a violation... was the result of gross negligence or willful
misconduct. 1 47 The lack of similar language in CAA section
113(c)(4) is further evidence that Congress intended an ordinary

negligence standard.
Third, an ordinary negligence standard is warranted in light of
the CAA's status as a "public welfare statute."'1 48 Currently, a number of federal courts have held that the CAA is a "public welfare
statute."1 49 Additionally, such a classification is warranted in light
of the regulatory nature and goals of the CAA. As one commentator noted:
144. See Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1120 (citing Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); see also United States v.
Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278, 1282 (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001)).
145. See id. at 1120-21 (citing BLACK's LAw DICTIONARv 1032 (6th ed. 1990);
THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 891 (Rev. ed. 1980)). See also Ortiz, 427
F.3d at 1283.
146. See Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1121; Ortiz, 427 F.3d at 1283 (analyzing congressional intent).
147. See Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1121 (reinforcing plain language) (emphasis
added).
148. See United States v. Kung-Shou Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 606 (5th Cir. 2002)
(stating CAA as whole is public welfare statute, involving heavily regulated area
with great ramifications for public health and safety); United States v. Buckley, 934
F.2d 84, 88 (6th Cir. 1991) (expanding on "public welfare statute").
149. See United States v. Grace, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1228 (D. Mont. 2006)
(holding that CAA is public welfare statute).
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There is no clear-cut test to determine whether a law is a
public welfare statute. However, public welfare statutes do
share several characteristics. First, the statutory scheme
must protect the public health, safety or welfare. In applying this prong, courts have looked to the plain language of
the statute and to the legislative purpose for enacting the
law. Second it would be difficult for bystanders to protect
themselves against the type of violations targeted by the
law ...Third, the law has either a reduced mens rea re150
quirement or none at all.
Utilizing this analysis it is clear that the CAA qualifies as a "public welfare statute." The CAA was enacted by Congress to protect
public health, safety or welfare 1 5' because the public generally is
not able to protect itself from the dangers of air pollution, but
rather must rely upon federal, state and local governments. 152 Furthermore, in enacting CAA section 113(c) (4), Congress eliminated
the mens rea element of the offense, requiring only a finding of negligence for purposes of imposing criminal penalties. An ordinary
negligence standard for the provision will also be more effective in
achieving one of the CAA's stated goals, "to protect and enhance
the quality of the [n]ation's air resources so as to promote the pub153
lic health and welfare."
Fourth, interpreting CAA section 113(c) (4) as requiring an ordinary negligence standard is consistent with a number of federal
and state court decisions that have upheld the use of such a standard of negligence in connection with prosecutions under various
federal and state statutes. For example, as discussed in Part I of this
article, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits in Hanousek and Ortiz held
that the term "negligently" requires a showing of only ordinary negligence to secure a conviction under the CWA section
309(c) (1) (A). Similarly, in connection with the prosecution of the
captain of the oil tanker Exxon Valdez for a negligent discharge of
150. See Wise, Personal Liability Promotes Responsible Conduct: Extending the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine to Federal Civil Enforcement Cases, 21 STAN. ENvrL.
L.J. 283, 317-20 (2002) (studying impact of responsible corporate officer
doctrine).
151. See id. at 319 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (a) (2) (2001)) (holding that one
goal of CAA is to protect and enhance quality of Nation's air resources so as to
promote public health and welfare and productive capacity of its populations).
152. See id. (stating "[i]f a company pollutes the air in a community, there is
simply no reasonable measure that individuals can take (either to clean the air or
not to breathe it) to effectively protect themselves from the contamination").
153. See CAA § 101(b)(1) (explaining purpose of statute); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401(b) (1) (2000) (explaining purpose of statute).
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oil,' 54 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that the term "negligently"

as used in the criminal charging provision of the state's environmental law required proof of only ordinary negligence. 1 55 The Supreme Court of Alaska also noted that such a standard for criminal
prosecution is not unique and that "the overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions" in the United States provide for the prosecution of
"crimes based on ordinary negligence."1 56
Finally, there is precedent for such a standard in conjunction
with a prosecution under CAA section 113(c) (4). Although there
are currently no published federal court decisions addressing the
applicable standard of negligence under this charging provision,
there have been prosecutions. In United States v. Hammer, 57 a CAA
negligent endangerment prosecution brought in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Missouri, the jury instructions defined the term "negligently" as:
An act is done negligently if one fails to use due care
under the circumstances. Ordinary care is that care which
reasonably prudent persons would exercise in the management of their own affairs. Because the amount of care exercised by a reasonably prudent person varies in
proportion to the danger known to be involved in what is
being done, the amount of caution required in the use of
ordinary care will vary with the nature of what is being
done, and all the surrounding circumstances shown by the
evidence of the case. To put it another way, any increase
158
in foreseeable danger requires increase care.
As a result, it is appropriate to interpret the term "negligently"
as used in CAA section 113(c) (4) as requiring proof of ordinary
154. See State of Alaska v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1997), rev'd, 912
P.2d 1266 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). The Alaska statute under which Hazelwood was
charged provided in pertinent part that "a person may not discharge, cause to be
discharged, or permit the discharge of petroleum... into, or upon the waters or
land of the state except in quantities, and at times and locations or under circumstances and conditions as the department may by regulation permit ... " Id. at
878 (quoting ALAsA STAT. § 46.03.740 (2005)).
155. See id. at 885 (disclosing applicable standard). The standard demands
"the risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe
in the situation." Id. at 877 (citing Hazelwood, 912 P.2d at 1278).
156. See id. at 884 n.17 (citations omitted) (demonstrating frequency of prosecution for ordinary negligence crimes).
157. No.97-05005-01-CR-SW-RGC (W.D.Mo. 1997).
158. See Jury Instructions No. 19, United States v. Hammer, No. 97-05005-01CR-SW-RGC (W.D.Mo. 1997) (defining "negligently") (on file with author).
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negligence, as opposed to a heightened standard of gross or criminal negligence.
b.

Elements

Under an "ordinary negligence" standard, the government
would be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. The defendant had a duty to act in a particular manner
or to abide by a particular standard of care (duty/standard
of care);

2. the defendant breached that duty by failing to use such
care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would
have used in similar circumstances (breach of duty);
3. the defendant's breach was the cause-in-fact of the release of hazardous air pollutants/extremely hazardous
substances, and placing another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury (cause-in-fact); and
4. the defendant's breach was the proximate cause of
such release and endangerment (proximate cause).159
With regard to the issue of the applicable standard of care or
duty for purposes of CAA section 113(c) (4), one potential source of
guidance may be found in CAA section 112(r) (1), otherwise commonly referred to as the "General Duty" clause. The stated objective of the General Duty clause is to "prevent the accidental release
and to minimize the consequences of any such release" of regulated
substances, including, but not limited to, those extremely hazardous substances listed pursuant to the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA).160 The clause imposes a

number of obligations on owners and operators of stationary
sources, including: identifying hazards which may result from accidental releases using appropriate hazard assessment techniques; designing and maintaining a safe facility in order to prevent releases;
and minimizing the consequences of accidents when they occur. 16 1
159. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965) (explaining
elements of cause of action for negligence)
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (r) (1) (2000) (establishing purpose of General Duty

clause).
161. See id. § 7412(r)(1) (noting who bears obligations under statute); Guidance for Implementation of the GeneralDuty Clause Clean Air Act § 112(r)(1), EPA 550BOO-002 (May 2000) [hereinafter Guidance] (discussing how General Duty clause

works in practice); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Emergency Response and PlanningRequirements Applicable to Unpermitted Air Pollution Releases, 2005 BYU L. REv. 1075, 1184
(2005) (explaining duties under General Duty clause).
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The General Duty clause does not prescribe the measures an
owner or operator must take in order to comply, but rather requires owners and operators first to look to "applicable industry
practices or standards, or state or federal regulations." 16 2 If no such
industry standards or regulations exist, they are required to take
"appropriate measures" to prevent releases or minimize the consequences of such releases. 16 3 In effect, these industry standards, regulations and appropriate measures provide a basis for evaluating
whether a person has breached his or her standard of care/duty
and, therefore, acted negligently for purposes of CAA section
113 (c) (4).
3.

Release into Ambient Air

In order to secure a conviction under CAA section 113(c) (4),
the government must prove that a defendant is responsible for negligently releasing into the ambient air certain designated hazardous
164
air pollutants or extremely hazardous substances.
a. Release
The CAA does not define the term "release" for purposes of
CAA section 113(c) (4). This term is defined in a number of other
federal environmental statutes and regulations, and generally refers
to some type of emission or discharge. Under CAA section
112(r) (2) (A), an "accidental release" is defined to mean "an unanticipated emission of a regulated substance or other extremely hazardous substance into the ambient air from a stationary source."' 65
Similarly, the CERCLA and the EPCRA both define the term "release" to mean "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting,
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or
disposing into the environment."1 66 There is nothing either in the
language of CAA section 113(c) (4) or its legislative history to sug162. See Guidance, supra note 161, at 12 (offering aspects to consider when
assessing compliance).
163. See id. (describing how to best comply with general duty clause of CAA).
164. See United States v. Grace, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1239 n.31 (D. Mont.
2006) (disclosing five-year statute of limitations applicable to CAA's Knowing Endangerment offense). Offenses under CAA § 113(c) (4) are subject to the five-year
statute of limitations provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (2) (A) (2000) (detailing definition of "accidental
release").
166. See id. § 9601(22) (defining "release"); 42 U.S.C. § 11049(8) (defining
.release"). See also Amland Props. Corp. v. Aluminum Co. Am., 711 F. Supp. 784,
793 (D.N.J. 1989) (demonstrating for CERCLA purposes, "courts have been inclined to give a broad reading to the terms 'release' and 'threatened release'").
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gest that Congress intended a different or narrower definition of
the term for purposes of the charging provision.
Additionally, it is important to note that CAA section 113(c) (4)
does not contain a size or quantity threshold for purposes of triggering a criminal prosecution. Rather, the "offense covers all release of all hazardous air pollutants listed in § 7412 [or extremely
hazardous substances under section 112 of the EPCRA] regardless
of size or quantity of the release so long as the release causes immi167
nent danger."
CAA section 113(c), however, does contain a limitation or
shield to prosecution under the CAA's knowing and negligent endangerment provisions. 168 More specifically, CAA section
113 (c) (5) (A), commonly referred to as the "emissions clause," provides that for any air pollutant for which the Administrator has set
an emissions standard or for any source for which a CAA permit has
been issued, a release of such an air pollutant either in accordance
with its emission standard or the terms of an applicable CAA permit
does not constitute a violation for purposes of either the knowing or
negligent endangerment provisions of the CAA.169 To date, at least

one federal court has held that the "emission clause" constitutes an
affirmative defense and that the burden to raise and prove the ap170
plicability of the clause rests on a defendant.
One final matter that has yet to be resolved, but may have significant implications for the government and defense bar, is
whether CAA section 113(c) (4) is limited to releases from stationary sources, or whether releases from mobile sources may also trigger criminal liability. For example, it is unclear whether the CAA's
negligent endangerment provision would apply to a negligent release of a hazardous air pollutant from a tanker truck on the nation's highways that causes imminent danger of serious bodily
injury to passing motorists. The language of the CAA provision on
its face does not make a distinction between releases from stationary or mobile sources. Such an interpretation, however, may be in
conflict with the underlying regulatory structure of the CAA. CAA
section 112, the primary section of the CAA addressing the regulation of hazardous air pollutants, is limited in scope to releases from
167. See Grace, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 1232 (stressing imminence as determinative
factor for offense).
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (5) (A) (2000) (providing limitation to prosecution).
169. See id. (describing effect of obtaining permit).
170. See Grace, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 1236 (discussing legislative intent to include
affirmative defense).
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stationary sources. 17 1 As a result, an argument can be made that
CAA section 113(c) (4) should also be interpreted as applying only
to releases from stationary sources.
b.

Ambient Air

Under CAA section 113(c)(4), the government must prove
that a release has been made into "ambient air."' 17 2 The term "ambient air" is not defined for purposes of the criminal enforcement
provisions of the CAA. Guidance concerning its meaning can be
found in the legislative history of the 1990 Amendments to the
CAA. The House bill that was part of the conference process for
the 1990 Amendments "limited the scope of the endangerment
provisions to releases into the ambient air." 173 The corresponding
Senate bill was much broader in scope, covering "all releases into
the air... not only the ambient air but also the air inside the workplace. 1 74 In reconciling these two bills, the Conference Committee ultimately adopted the House version and the term "ambient
air" was enacted into law. 1 75 As a result, the legislative history for
the 1990 amendments indicates that the CAA's negligent endangerment provision is limited to releases that occur outside of buildings
or confined spaces.
Such a position is consistent with how this term has been defined in other federal statutes and regulations. For example, as
part of the regulations promulgated by the EPA for National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards under the
CAA, the term "ambient" is defined as "that part of the atmosphere,
17 6
external to buildings, to which the general public has access."'
Similarly, as part of the Agency's regulations implementing CERCLA, "ambient air" is defined to mean "air that is not completely
enclosed in a building or structure and that is over and around the
grounds of a facility."1 7 7 As a result, releases that occur inside a
building or structure, and which either do not escape or have the
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (2000) (defining stationary source).
172. See id. § 7413(c) (4) (identifying element of statute).
173. See Stephen E. Roady, Permitting and Enforcement Under the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, 21 ENV-rL. L. REP. 10178, 10200 (1991) (defining legislative
intent).
174. See id. at *34 n.182 (citing S.1630 at section 601 (c) (2) and (c)(5)) (discussing benefits of broad interpretation).
175. See id. at *34 n.183 (interpreting narrower definition into statute).
176. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 50.1(e) (defining ambient air).
177. See Notification Requirements; Reportable Quality Adjustments, 50 Fed.
Reg. 13456, 13462 (April 4, 1985) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 117) (elaborating characteristics of ambient air).
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potential to escape outside the structure, will most likely not qualify
as releases into "ambient air" for purposes of CAA section
113(c) (4).
4. Hazardous Air Pollutants/Extremely Hazardous Substances
In order to be covered by CAA section 113(c) (4), there must
be a release of either a hazardous air pollutant provided under CAA
section 112 or an extremely hazardous substance listed pursuant to
EPCRA section 302(a)(2). 178 For purposes of the CAA, the term
"hazardous air pollutant" is defined as "any air pollutant listed pursuant to [CAA section 112(b)]."1 79 As part of the 1990 Amendments, Congress established in CAA section 112(b) an initial list of
189 hazardous air pollutants that are regulated by the CAA. 18° Pursuant to CAA section 112(b) (2), EPA is tasked with periodically revising and/or modifying this list as appropriate. 18 1 A list of
"extremely hazardous substances" that are subject to regulation
under EPCRA section 302(a) is set forth at 40 CFR part 35, Appen82
dices A and B.1

5.

Negligent Endangerment of Another Person

As part of a prosecution under CAA section 113 (c) (4), the government is required to prove that, at the time of the release, a person other than the individual or entity responsible for the release
was negligently placed in "imminent danger of death or serious
bodily injury." The term "imminent danger" is not defined for purposes of the CAA's knowing and negligent endangerment offenses.
As previously discussed, these provisions were modeled on similar

provisions in the CWA and RCRA.18 3 In connection with a prosecution under RCRA's knowing endangerment provision, the term
"imminent danger" was defined as "the existence of a condition or
combination of conditions which could reasonably be expected to
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (4) (2000) (summarizing language of statute).
179. See id. § 7412(a)(6) (defining hazardous air pollutant).
180. See Wichers, Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants Under the New Clean Air
Act: Technology-Based Standards at Last, 22 ENVrL. L. REP. 10717, nf. 31-38 (Nov.

1992). See also 40 C.F.R. pt. 61.01 (discussing EPA's responsibility).
181. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (2) (2000) (outlining authority to revise listing).
182. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 355 (2006), Appendices A and B (listing extremely hazardous substances and their threshold planning quantities).
183. See Grace, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 1235 (quoting S. Rpt. No. 103-38(I) (1993)),
reprinted in Legislative History of Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, at 941
(1993). The criminal provisions of CAA section 113(c) "are largely modeled upon
those contained in the [Clean Water Act (CWA)] and [the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA)], and we expect them to operate in the same fashion as
those have operated." Id.
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cause death or serious bodily injury unless the condition is
84
remedied."1
In United States v. Hansen,1 8 5 a prosecution under RCRA's
knowing endangerment provision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that "danger" for purposes of the offense
can be proven through the introduction of expert testimony and
reports addressing potential injuries. 186 Additionally, with regard
to the phrase "imminent danger," courts have held that the danger
associated with a release must be imminent, while the consequences of such imminent danger (the death or serious bodily in-

187
jury) need not manifest themselves for a period of time, if at all.

The term "serious bodily injury" is defined in the CAA's criminal charging provisions to mean "bodily injury which involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain,
protracted and obvious disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ or mental
faculty." 188 This definition is most likely not exhaustive, and other
types of injuries that are comparable, but not specifically listed in
the aforementioned definition, will probably be held to constitute
"serious bodily injury" for purposes of CAA section 113(c) (4).189

Finally, it is important to note that the government does not
bear the burden of proving that a person has actually suffered
death or serious bodily injury in order to convict a defendant under
CAA section 113(c)(4). Rather, it is sufficient that a person is
placed in imminent danger of either death or serious bodily injury
as a result of a defendant's actions.

184. See United States v. Protex Indus., Inc., 874 F.2d 740, 744-45 (10th Cir.
1989) (affirming court and rejecting defendant's argument that term should be
defined as requiring "substantial certainty" as opposed to "reasonable

expectation").
185. 262 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1111 (2002).
186. See id. at 1243-44 (providing example of proving criminal offense).
187. See Protex Indus., Inc., 874 F.2d at 743 (explaining enhanced "risk" of contracting some indeterminate type of cancer at some unspecified time in future is
sufficient to constitute serious bodily injury).
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (5) (F) (2000) (defining "serious bodily injury").
189. SeeJohn Gibson, The Crime of "KnowingEndangerment" Under the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990: Is It More "Bark Than Bite" as a Watchdog to Help Safeguard a
Workplace Free From Life-Threatening Hazardous Air Pollutant Releases?, 6 FoRHAM
ENrrL. L.J. 197, 216-17 (1995) (listing injuries constituting serious bodily injury).
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6. Applicable Defenses
The CAA specifically provides that:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution that the conduct charged was freely consented to by the person endangered and that the danger and conduct charged were
reasonably foreseeable hazards or - (i) an occupation, a
business, or a profession; or (ii) medical treatment or
medical or scientific experimentation conducted by professionally approved methods and such other person had
been made aware of the risks involved prior to giving
consent." 190
Furthermore, a defendant retains under the CAA "[a]ll general defenses, affirmative defenses, and bars to prosecution that
may apply with respect to other Federal criminal offenses, including, but not limited to [c]oncepts of justification and excuse."1'9
IV.

A.

CRIMINAL PENALTIES AND SENTENCING

CWA section 309(c)(1)(A)
1.

Criminal Penalties

Negligence-based offenses under CWA section 309(c) (1) are
Class A misdemeanors 192 subject to either a term of imprisonment
of up to one year, a fine of not less than 2500 dollars nor more than
25 thousand dollars per day of violation, or both. 19 3 Subsequent
convictions under the statute are subject to a term of imprisonment
of not more than two years and/or a fine of not more than 50 thousand dollars per day of violation. 194 Unlike the other major federal
environmental statutes enforced by the EPA, the CWA's charging
provisions are unique in that they provide not only for a statutory
maximum fine amount, but also prescribe a statutory minimum of
2500 dollars in those cases in which a fine is imposed on a
95
defendant.1
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(C)

(2000) (describing defense to CAA

prosecution).
191. See id. § 7413(c)(5)(D) (noting all criminal defenses apply in current
situation).
192. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6) (2000) (classifying negligence-based defen-

ses).
193. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A) (2000) (detailing punishment for negligence-based defenses).
194. See id. (explaining punishment for subsequent convictions for negligence-based offenses).
195. See id. § 1319(c)(1) (stating minimum fine under CWA).
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With regard to the calculation of a fine for purposes of CWA
section 309(c) (1), the terms and requirements of the Alternative
Fines Act (AFA) must be considered. Generally, the AFA applies to
all federal crimes, unless the law setting forth an offense "specifies
no fine or a fine that is lower than the fine otherwise applicable"
under the AFA, and the charging statute specifically exempts the
offense from the AFA. In situations where it is applicable, the AFA
sets forth a separate fine schedule. More specifically, under the
AFA, an individual convicted of a Class A misdemeanor may be
fined the greater of: 100 thousand dollars for an offense that does
not result in death; 250 thousand dollars for an offense that results
in death; twice the gain or loss resulting from the crime; or "the
amount specified in the law setting forth the offense." 19 6 With respect to organizations, the AFA establishes a maximum fine for a
Class A misdemeanor the greater of: 200 thousand dollars for an
offense that does not result in death; 500 thousand dollars for an
offense that results in death; twice the gain or loss resulting from
the crime; or "the amount specified in the law setting forth the offense."1 9 7 To date, the government has argued successfully to at
least one U.S. Court of Appeals that the AFA is applicable to criminal prosecutions under the CWA and that, more specifically, fines
for convictions under the CWA section 309(c) (1) (A) should be calculated in accordance with the AFA.' 98
Finally, in addition to the aforementioned criminal penalties, a
person convicted under CWA section 309(c) (1) also may receive
the following sentences: a term of probation; 199 an order to provide
20 1
restitution to victims of the crime; 200 special court assessments;
and community service. 20 2 Additionally, an organization, like a corporation, that has been convicted under CWA section 309(c) (1)
will be precluded from entering into certain types of contracts with
the federal government concerning the procurement of goods,
20 3
materials or services.
196. See id. §§ 3571 (b) (1), (d) (describing fines).
197. See id. §§ 3571(c), (d) (describing fines).
198. See United States v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528, 533 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding
that fines under CWA should be determined pursuant to AFA).
199. See 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (2000) (describing sentence of probation).
200. See id. § 3663 (describing order of restitution).
201. See id. § 3013 (describing special assessments on convicted persons).
202. See id. § 3563(b) (12) (describing conditions of probation).
203. See 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (2000) (prohibiting formation of federal contracts with offenders).
No [f]ederal agency may enter into any contract with any person, who
has been convicted of any offense under section 1319(c) of this title, for
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Sentencing Factors and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines

The sentence of a defendant convicted under CWA section
309(c)(1) will be determined in accordance with the sentencing
factors set forth in Title 18 of the United States Code section 3553,
which require that a federal judge take into consideration, inter alia,
the United States Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual
(Guidelines Manual or Guidelines).204 The Guidelines were issued
by the United States Sentencing Commission pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984205 and became effective on November
1, 1987.206 Their stated goals are to provide honesty, uniformity
and proportionality in sentencing.2 0 7 In 2005, the U.S. Supreme
Court in United States v. Booker2°8 held that the Guidelines are no
longer mandatory, but only advisory for sentencing purposes.2 09
More specifically, the Court held that "district courts, while not
bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and
take them into account when sentencing."2 1 0 District courts are still
required to make an accurate Guidelines calculation as part of the
sentencing process, and sentences determined in accordance with

the Guidelines are deemed to be "per se" reasonable. 2 11
Guidelines calculations for individuals convicted of environmental crimes are governed by Part 2Q of the Guidelines Manual. 2 12 Generally, the Part 2Q Guidelines establish a base offense

level and provide for upwards or downwards adjustments based
the procurement of goods, materials, and services if such contract is to be
performed at any facility at which the violation which gave rise to such
conviction occurred, and if such facility is owned, leased, or supervised by
such person.

Id.
204. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000) (listing factors to consider in imposing
sentence).
205. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § IA1.1 (2005) (describing history of GUIDELINES MANUAL) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL].
206. See id. at cmt. n.1 (2005); see generally Kate Stith and Steve Y. Koh, The
Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the FederalSentencing Guidelines,
28 WAKE FoREsT L. Rav. 223 (1993); Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises on Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1988).
207. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005) (explaining that
Congress sought to achieve "honesty," "uniformity" and "proportionality" in
sentencing).
208. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
209. See id. at 262-64 (stating necessity of Guidelines Manual).
210. See id. at 264 (citing statute).
211. See id. at 261-63 (stating court of appeals review sentencing decisions for
unreasonableness, helping to avoid excessive sentencing discrepancies and maintaining flexibility).
212. See Barrett, J., CriminalEnforcement of EnvironmentalLaws: Sentencing Environmental Crimes Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines - A Sentencing Lottery, 22 ENVTL.
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upon case specific characteristics.2 13 Most federal environmental
crimes are governed by Guidelines sections 2Q1.2 or 2Q1.3, depending on the particular pollutant involved in a case. 2 14 Guidelines section 2Q1.2 pertains to offenses involving the mishandling
of hazardous/toxic substances or pesticides.2 15 Guidelines section
2Q1.3 concerns offenses involving the mishandling of pollutants
not covered by Guidelines section 2Q1.2. 2 16 Organizations convicted of an environmental offense are subject to the provisions in
Chapter 8 of the Guidelines.
Defendants convicted under CWA section 309(c) (1) will have
their Sentencing Guidelines calculations performed under either
Guidelines section 2Q1.2 or 2Q1.3 depending upon the nature of
the pollutant involved in their cases. 2 17 As a result, Guidelines section 2Q1.2 will be applicable to cases of negligent violations of the
CWA involving hazardous/toxic substances or pesticides. Guidelines section 2Q1.3 will govern cases of negligent violations of the
CWA involving other types of pollutants.
In most respects, the Guidelines function identically with regard to both knowing and negligence offenses. Application Note 4
for Guidelines section 2Q1.2 and Application Note 3 for Guidelines
section 2Q1.3, however, specifically provide that in cases involving
crimes based upon negligent conduct, a downward departure may
be warranted in light of the offense characteristics of a specific
2 18
case.
3.

Case Applications of Guidelines
a.

United States v. Hanousek

In Hanousek, the defendant's sentencing guidelines were calculated pursuant to Guidelines section 2Q1.3 because the district
court considered oil, which was the pollutant discharged into the
L. 1421, 1426 (1992) (stating applicable sentencing guidelines for environmental
crimes) [hereinafter Barrett].
213. See generally GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q (2005) (describing point system
used to calculate the offense).
214. See Barrett, supra note 212 at 1426 (stating applicable sentencing guidelines for environmental crimes).
215. See GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q1.2; see also Barrett, supra note 212 at 1426
(describing Section 2Q1.2).
216. See GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q1.3 (describing section 2Q1.3).
217. See id. §§ 2Q1.2, 2Q1.3 (noting that each section applied to specific
substances).
218. See id. at §§ 2Q1.2 cmt. n.4, 2Q1.3 cmt. n.3 (noting availability of downward adjustment of sentence when negligence present).
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Skagway River, neither a hazardous nor a toxic substance. 2 19 Under
Guidelines section 2Q1 3 the defendant's calculation started with a
base offense level of six.22° The district court increased the calculation upwards by four offense levels under Guidelines section
2Q1.3(b) (1) (B) because the defendant's crimes involved a discharge or release of a pollutant and also made a two-level adjustment upwards based upon the defendant's supervisory role in the
offense. 2 21 Combining the defendant's total offense level of twelve
and his Criminal History Category of I, resulted in a Guidelines
range of ten to sixteen months (Zone C).222 Hanousek was sentenced to six months in a halfway house, and six months of supervised release. 223 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence and ruled
224
that the district court had correctly calculated the Guidelines.
b.

United States v. Ortiz

In Ortiz, the defendant also was sentenced pursuant to Guidelines section 2Q1.3 because the district court determined that the
nature of the pollutant involved in the case was neither hazardous
nor toxic.

225

The district court started with a base offense level of

six but then refused the government's request to increase the calculation by six offense levels under Guidelines section
2Q1.3(b) (1) (A). 2 26 The court held that the government had failed

to prove that the defendant discharged pollutants on a continuous
219. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at **59-60, United States v. Hanousek,
No. 97-30185, 1997 WL 33487093 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 1997) (stating on which section of GUIDELINES MANUAL court relied in calculating sentence). It is important
to note that the Hanousek case was decided prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Booker.
220. See GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q1.3(a) (stating base offense level of section
2Q1.3).
221. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at *60, United States v. Hanousek, No.
97-30185, 1997 WL 33487093 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 1997); (explaining how guidelines
affected defendant's penalty); see also GUIDELINES MANUAL at § 3BI.I(c) (citing

statutory authority for aggravating role).
222. See GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1AI.1 at Sentencing Table (noting defendant
must have been organizer, leader, manager or supervisor of one or more of
participants).
223. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at **3-4, United States v. Hanousek, No.
97-30185, 1997 WL 33487093 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 1997) (citing CR 340, RT at 1)
(stating sentence imposed by district court).
224. See Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1126 (affirming sentence imposed by lower
court).
225. See United States v. Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2005) (showing
on which section of Guidelines Manual court relied).
226. See id. at 1285-86 (explaining how court determined sentence); see also
Opening Brief of Appellant at *15, United States v. Ortiz, No. 04-1228 (10th Cir.
Apr. 27, 2005) (describing sentencing tables employed by court).
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basis. 22 7 The court also refused the government's request to increase the calculation by four levels in light of the defendant's discharge without a permit under Guidelines section 2Q1.3(b) (4).228
It held that the enhancement is only applicable when a permit is
available for the activity and in this case the defendant had failed to
obtain one. 229 The court sentenced Ortiz to twelve months imprisonment. 23 0 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded.
With regard to the four level increase for a discharge without a permit, the Tenth Circuit held that "factual impossibility of obtaining a
permit is not a defense to 2Q1.3(b)(4) enhancement."' 23 1 The
Tenth Circuit also held that Guidelines section 2Q1.3(b) (1) (A) applies to negligent discharge violations. 23 2 It did note that a downward departure may be warranted in such cases due to the fact that
negligence, as opposed to knowing conduct, was involved. 23 3 As of
the writing of this Article, the defendant in Ortiz has yet to be resentenced.
B.

CAA section 113(c)(4)
1.

CriminalPenalties

CAA section 113(c) (4) provides for the imposition of Class A
misdemeanor-level penalties. 23 4 More specifically, a defendant convicted pursuant to CAA section 113(c) (4) is subject to a fine to be
determined in accordance with Title 18 of the United States Code
(i.e., the Alternative Fines Act) and/or a term of imprisonment not
to exceed one year. 235 If the defendant is a repeat offender previ-

ously convicted under CAA section 113(c) (4), "the maximum punishment shall be doubled with respect to both the fine and
imprisonment."

236

227. See Ortiz, 427 F.3d at 1285-86 (holding government had to establish more
than two discharges).
228. See id. at 1284 (stating holding of Ortiz).
229. See id. (finding it unlikely defendant could obtain permit to dump chemical waste into river).
230. See id. at 1281 (finding no evidence of defendant's awareness).
231. See id. at 1284 (reviewing defendant's decision de novo).
232. See Ortiz, 427 F.3d at 1286 (holding that lower court is erroneous for
finding that Ortiz's offense did not result in ongoing, continuous or repetitive
discharge of pollutant).
233. See id. at 1285-86 (explaining in Application Note 3 that cases involving
negligent conduct downward departure may be unwarranted).
234. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (6) (2000) (imposing sentence of one year or less
but more than six months).
235. See42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (4) (2000) (imposing punishment for ambient air
pollution).
236. See id. (providing punishment for second conviction).
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Sentencing Factors and Sentencing Guidelines

Defendants convicted under CAA section 113(c)(4) will have
their sentences determined in accordance with the sentencing factors set forth in Title 18 United States Code section 3553, including
the Guidelines. 23 7 Because offenses under CAA section 113(c)(4)
involve either hazardous air pollutants or extremely hazardous substances, sentencing guidelines calculations are governed by Guidelines section 2Q1.2.
Generally, Guidelines section 2Q1.2 establishes a base offense
level of eight and then provides for various upward or downward
adjustments depending upon case specific factors. For example, up
to a six offense level increase may be applicable if the underlying
offense involves a release of a hazardous or toxic substance. 238 Nevertheless, application of this part of the Guidelines is fact-specific
and "[d]epending upon the harm resulting from the emission, release or discharge, the quantity and nature of the substance or pollutant, the duration of the offense and the risk associated with the
violation, a departure of up to two levels in either direction" may be
appropriate. 239 Additionally, up to a nine level increase may be
warranted if the offense resulted in a substantial likelihood of death
or serious bodily injury. 240 Further, if death or serious bodily injury
results, a departure pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines Chapter
Five, Part K may be warranted. 24 1 Because CAA section 113(c) (4)
addresses negligent offenses, the Guidelines specifically provide
that a downward departure may be warranted. 242 Ultimately, a
term of imprisonment imposed for a conviction under CAA section
113(c)(4) may not exceed the one-year statutory maximum per
count.
V.

CONCLUSION

The very idea of the federal government being able to charge a
person with an environmental crime, albeit a misdemeanor, while
not having the burden to produce evidence of either criminal in237. See

GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 1B1.9 (2005) (describing sentence determina-

tion for defendants convicted under CAA section 113(c) (4)).
238. See id. § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A)-(B) (describing offenses).
239. See id. § 2Q1.2(b) cmt. n.5 (noting important characteristics of offenses).
240. See id. § 2Q1.2(b)(2) (describing punishment for offenses resulting in
death or serious bodily injury).
241. See id. § 2Q1.2(b) cmt. n.6 (recommending departure from normal sentencing when death or serious bodily injury results from offense).
242. See GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q1.2 cmt. n.4 (2005) (providing that cases
involving negligent conduct warrant downward departure).
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tent or criminal negligence, may seem to some an anathema to the
American criminal justice system. As previously discussed, however,
the negligence-based criminal charging provisions of the CWA and
CAA are neither novel nor contrary to notions of constitutional due
process. Rather, they represent a careful balancing between the
rights of a defendant and the need of the public to be protected
from certain conduct that may have serious adverse consequences
on human health and the environment.
Although infrequently used, these charging authorities still
play a vital role in the EPA's efforts to enforce the nation's environmental laws. They provide a substantial deterrent and incentive to
members of the regulated community to institute preventative measures to ensure that regulatory violations and releases of certain
pollutants into our environment do not occur.
An ordinary negligence standard for purposes of securing a
criminal conviction under these charging provisions is not only warranted in light of the plain language of the statutes, but it is also
essential for purposes of achieving the primary goal of these laws the protection of public health and the environment. The overwhelming majority of the federal courts have yet to issue rulings
concerning the applicable standard of negligence required under
the CWA and CAA negligence-based charging provisions. The case
holdings in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, however, are virtually
identical and the opinions are firmly grounded in well-accepted canons of statutory interpretation. These rulings will most likely serve
as harbingers as to how other Circuits will address this issue, and it
is likely the government will argue in the future for an ordinary
negligence standard under the CWA and CAA.
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